ABSTRACT Attribute-based encryption has broad application prospects. GVW'13 attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme is one of the major candidates for ABE. The scheme has exquisite structure and proven security, and the crucial component is two-to-one recoding (TOR) algorithm. However, it has security risks in practical applications. In this paper, we describe this security risk, the collusion trap against GVW'13 ABE. In such a scenario: Alice and Bob collude to share decryption ability. In other words, when anyone can decrypt the ciphertext, he will tell the other one the corresponding plaintext. If Bob decrypts Alice's fake ciphertext and returns ''corresponding plaintext'' to Alice, Alice can attempt to gradually calculate Bob's secret key. We use the method of chosen-ciphertext attack of Jaulmes and Joux against NTRU to construct our attack. We show that whether for naked encryption or for calibrated encryption, Alice can obtain the equivalent secret key of Bob in polynomial time, although the size of the attack for calibrated encryption is much larger.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attribute-based encryption (ABE), introduced in [1] and [2] , is a novel concept for public key encryption which supports fine-grained control of access to encrypted data. Here, an encryption of a message m is labeled with a public attribute vector att (also called the ''index''), and a secret key is associated with a circuit C (also called the ''predicate''). The encryption of a message m can be decrypted by applying secret key sk C if and only if att satisfied C, namely if and only if C(att) = 1. The application prospect of ABE is relatively broad, and its research is also hot [3] - [18] .
Gorbunov et al. [19] proposed first ABE scheme based on learning with error where predicate can be any arbitrary (a-priori bounded) polynomial circuits. The scheme GVW has exquisite structure and proven security, and the crucial component is two-to-one recoding (TOR) algorithm.
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Generally GVW'13 ABE can be naked encryption, where the plaintext has no calibration part. To resist chosen-ciphertext attack of Jaulmes and Joux against NTRU [20] it may be calibrated encryption, where the plaintext has a calibration part.
In this paper we describe collusion trap against GVW'13 ABE. In such a scenario: Suppose Alice(with circuit C A ) and Bob(with circuit C B ) collude to share decryption ability. That is, when C A (att) = 1, Alice decrypts and tells Bob the corresponding plaintext; conversely, when C B (att) = 1, Bob decrypts and tells Alice the corresponding plaintext. Then Alice generates ''false'' ciphertexts with att such that C B (att) = 1, to let Bob decrypt. When Bob tells Alice ''the corresponding plaintexts'' of these ''false'' ciphertexts, Alice tries to gradually compute secret key of Bob.
We use the method of chosen-ciphertext attack of Jaulmes and Joux against NTRU to construct our attack. We show that whether for naked encryption or for calibrated encryption, Alice can obtain the equivalent secret key of Bob in polynomial time, although the size of the attack for calibrated encryption is much larger.
Obviously, that such ''collusion scene'' is hardly avoided. Besides, such ''collusion scene'' is different from original collusion scene, in which both C A (att) = 1 and C B (att) = 1, but Alice and Bob combine their powers trying to decrypt.
II. GVW'13 ABE
A. PRELIMINARIES OF GVW'13 ABE Take three positive integers (m, n, q) such that q = n (d max ) , m = O(nlogq), where d max is well explained in [19] . Take Z as the set of integers. For two integers (m , m ),
). Note that the output of the operation ''mod q'' is within
2 }, rather than within {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. Then following algorithms are well built just upon ideas introduced in [21] - [24] .
• Keygen(pp): input (m, n, q) and output (A, T), where A ∈ Z n×m q is uniform matrix, T ∈ Z m is small Gaussian matrix, AT = 0 ∈ Z n×m q , and T is full-ranked. Of course T is not full-ranked modular q. T is called a trapdoor of A.
• Encode(A, s): input (A, s) ∈ Z n×m q × Z n q and output ψ = A T s + e ∈ Z m q , where e ∈ Z m is small Gaussian vector. ψ is called an encoding of s, and e is called error vector.
• ReKeygen(A 0 , A 1 , T 0 , A 2 ): input (A 0 , A 1 , T 0 , A 2 ) and output R, where A i ∈ Z n×m q , i = 0, 1, 2 are uniform matrices, T 0 ∈ Z m×m is a trapdoor of A 0 , R ∈ Z 2m×m is small Gaussian matrix, and
then R 1 is pre-sampled, and R 0 is correspondingly sampled by using ''the basis of the lattice'' T 0 , such that
We call R 1 and R 0 pre-sampled and co-sampled matrix respectively.
• Recode(R,
q and output
. It is clear that ψ 2 = Encode(A 2 , s) for same s as long as the errortolerance is large enough.
A one-time symmetric encryption scheme (E, D) is as the follow. Suppose m ∈ {0, 1} m is the plaintext, γ is corresponding ciphertext, ψ and ψ are two encodings of same vector from Z n q with same matrix form Z n×m
A Boolean circuit y = C(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l ), with input (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l ), output y, and size l + |C| (where |C| denote the number of gate in circuit C), can be recursively expressed as the follow.
. . , x l+|C|−1 ) are called intermediate variables. We have three notes:
In other words, the index u i can be on ''either left side or right side''.
Otherwise C i is redundant, and the size of circuit is smaller than such |C|.
2) GENERATING SECRET KEY sk c FOR THE CIRCUIT C
Suppose C is recursively expressed as in subsection 2.1.
•
• Output sk C = {R
We have two notes: (1)
and
are not involved in sk C , but the former can be computed from sk C and mpk. VOLUME 7, 2019 (2) Suppose att = (a 1 , . . . , a l ), C(att) = 1. Then by sk C we can obtain equivalent secret key
We call s original vector, and e 1 , . . . , e l , e out error vectors.
4) DECRYPTION
Suppose C(att) = 1, and C is recursively expressed as in subsection 2.1.
• Recursively compute
. . .
• So we can compute m ← D(ψ l+|C| , γ ).
C. NAKED ENCRYPTION AND CALIBRATED ENCRYPTION
III. COLLUSION TRAP AGAINST NAKED ENCRYPTION OF GVW'13 ABE A. PRELIMINARY: AN ALGORITHM AND CORRESPONDING RESULTS
In this section we describe our collusion attack on naked encryption of GVW'13 ABE, where the plaintext has no calibration part.
For an attribute att, the equivalent secret key of Bob(the equivalent secret key of the circuit C B ) is denoted as W (C B ,att) . Suppose C B (att) = 1, and absolute values of entries of W (C B ,att) has a public upper bound 2 u , where u is at most polynomially large and 2 u < q/4. Then we take following algorithm.
• Take an entry w of W (C B ,att) 
Alice: , and she can obtain all rows of From this section on, we describe our collusion attack on calibrated encryption of GVW'13 ABE. We take a fixed calibrated plaintext m and an attribute att such that C B (att) = 1, and absolute values of entries of W (C B ,att) has a public upper bound 2 u , where u is at most polynomially large and 2 u < q/4. We try to obtain W (C B ,att) . For our successful attack, we take following Assumption 1.
IV. COLLUSION TRAP AGAINST CALIBRATED ENCRYPTION OF GVW'13 ABE: THE FIRST STEP
Assumption 1: Entries of each row of W (C B ,att) have different absolute values. In this section we first try to obtain the value and the position of such entry of the first row of W (C B ,att) 1 , which has the maximal absolute value of entries of this row. Suppose the value and the position of this unknown entry is (x 0 , i 0 ).
B. ALGORITHM (0,1) AND ALGORITHM (1, 1) In this subsection we try to obtain k 1 such that 2
Algorithm (0,1) Alice:
• m is as above For i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., do Alice:
• Decrypt ct att to obtain ''the corresponding plaintext '' or ''fault''
• Send ''the corresponding plaintext'' or ''fault'' to Alice Alice:
• else e := 2e(modq) and continue Alice:
• Suppose e = (e 0 , 0, . . . , 0) T , then output k (0,1) = log 2 ( Proposition 2: Algorithm (0,1) and Algorithm (1,1) certainly output k (0,1) and k (1, 1) . C. ALGORITHM (0,2) AND ALGORITHM (1, 2) Suppose k 1 = k (0,1) = k (1, 1) has been obtained from Algorithm (0,1) and Algorithm (1,1) . VOLUME 7, 2019 Algorithm (0,2) Alice:
• m is as above For i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., do Alice: (2 k 1 , 0, . . . , 0) T + e(modq),
• Denote e = (e 0 , 0, . . . , 0) T 
2 )'' is replaced by ''output k (1, 2) = log 2 ( e 0 2 )''. Similar as Proposition 2∼6, it is easy to check the correctness of following propositions.
Proposition 7: Algorithm (0,2) and Algorithm (1,2) certainly output k (0,2) and k (1, 2) . 
, where e (i) has the i th entry (a + 1)|x 0 |, and other entries 0.
• Output ''the ciphertext'' ct att = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ l , γ , att) • Send ct att to Bob Bob: , which has the maximal absolute value of entries of this row. We try to obtain (x 1 , i 1 ), the value and the position of such entry of the first row of W (C B ,att) 1 , which has the second largest absolute value of entries of this row.
We can still use Algorithm (0,1) and Algorithm (1,1), Algorithm (0,2) and Algorithm (1,2) , . . . , Algorithm (0, Position) and Algorithm (1, Position), to obtain (x 1 , i 1 ).
However, we need to modify these algorithms to eliminate (x 0 , i 0 ). This is easy task, for example, in Algorithm (0,1), it is enough to replace ''γ ← A Following this routine, we can obtain the value and the position of each entry of W (C B ,att) , with only small modification of those algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION
We show that GVW'13 ABE has potential safety hazards in practical applications. This security risk is entirely due to the fact that the encryption scheme cannot defend against CCA attacks. We will continue to analyze the CCA security of other post-quantum encryption algorithms.
